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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE PROCESS OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA*
YUAN-LI Wu
INTRODUCTION

Economic Benefits - Distribution and Growth
Analysis of economic development in quantitative aggregates
would be woefully incomplete if one were to ignore the distribution
of benefits of development. If we compare the GNP, a frequently
used quantitative measure of economic welfare, to a pie, successful
economic development will make the pie larger, as has been amply
demonstrated in the case of Taiwan. However, since a growing
"pie" is not produced merely as an object of wonderment, to be
admired in the abstract but not to be touched by anyone, how the
pie is sliced and how and when the slices are made available to
individual members of the society are an inalienable part of
economic development. Success or failure of the development
process must, therefore, be judged from the points of view of both
production and distribution.
Some students of economic development have even gone so far
as to suggest that a single index of economic development might
be constructed that would automatically take into account both
aspects 1 so that when the index is employed in choosing from
among economic policies and assessing their results, the best
policies chosen will automatically take both goals into account.
For instance, one might divide the population into five (or any
other number of) income classes in descending order of income
size, each class to consist of one-fifth (or quintile) of the total
population. One might then choose to consider a 1% increase in
income of the lowest fifth of the population to be equivalent to a
multiple of a 1% increase in the income of the highest one-fifth,
and so forth for the other income intervals. If such a weighting
system is adopted in calculating the result, a policy to achieve
* This paper is the advance draft of a chapter to be included in a
forthcoming symposium in memory of Ta-chung Liu. Printed with the permission
of the author and the editors.
1. See Montek S. Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenery, "The Economic Framework," Chapter II in Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell, John H.
Dulay and Richard Jolly, Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1974). A. K. Sen has actually developed such a measure. See his "Real
National Income," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1976): 19·
39.
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high economic growth would automatically tend to favor an
accelerated increase in the income of the poorest one-fifth of the
population. Conversely, a policy favoring the poorest segment of
the population in income distribution would tend to yield a higher
calculated rate of growth even if the absolute increase in output
were constant.
The choice of weights in constructing such a comprehensive
index of development (i.e., including objectives in both production
and distribution) must in the final analysis rest on value
judgments, and a decision on this basis can be reached only as a
part of the society's political process, with the term "political"
being construed in a very broad sense, including both ideological
considerations and practical (i.e., institutional and other) constraints. However, before we proceed further, let us remind
ourselves of some of the relationships between production and
distribution in general, as well as the object of distribution.
First, the nature of the economic development strategy
followed will inevitably affect the pattern of income distribution,
which is a major component of the distribution of benefits in
general. For instance, an industry-first policy will initially and
directly create more income for those in industry- owners as well
as workers - and for those in both industry and non-industry
who sell to the industrial sector. Alternatively, an agriculture-first
strategy would have the corresponding primary effect on those
engaged in agriculture and in industries supplying agriculture.
Moreover, whether the development strategy aims at achieving
self-sufficiency or is export-orientated is another major channel of
causal relationship that directionally runs from production to
distribution. Still another element in development strategy which
has causal relationship running from production to distribution is
the choice between labor-intensive and capital-intensive methods
of production.
Second, a major determinant of the rate of expansion of
production is capital formation. Since private capital formation in
a market economy, even when there is an inflow of foreign capital,
is largely determined by the ayailability of domestic private
savings, the distribution of income, which could affect savings,
can influence the rate of increase of aggregate production,
although, according to some students, the propensity of thrift may
not vary as much between the rich and the poor in Taiwan as one
might be inclined to believe a priori. Furthermore, the pattern of
income distribution will also affect the composition of market
demand for goods, and, therefore, the demand for inputs and the
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rate at which production in the aggregate can expand. Here the
causal relationship is directionally reversed; the linkage is from
distribution to production.
A third linkage between production and distribution has to do
with the effect of the distributive pattern of economic benefits on
the institutional framework and socio-political environment
within which production takes place. If this environment is hostile
to the orderly planning and execution of economic activities,
production will not expand rapidly or steadily. Since no economic
system can realistically expect the benefits (and cost) of production to be shared absolutely equally by every member of the
society, whether the distributive pattern will lead to the emergence
of groups whose interests are mutually antagonistic becomes a
critical issue to social and political stability. For example, a
particular development strategy might consistently favor urban
dwellers and discriminate against rural residents so that ruralurban antagonism will in due course arise as an outcome of
opposition of economic interests. Antagonism may also stem from
conflicting economic interests between farmers and non-farmers,
between new immigrants and earlier settlers (e.g., the Chinese in
Malaysia versus the Malays under the Bumiputra program),
between those who were initially rich and those who were initially
poor, and so forth. If the economic development strategy followed
tends to create such antagonistic groups, the latter would work
against the emergence of political consensus which is needed for
an effective economic policy, including measures to modify the
distributive pattern that would otherwise prevail. Effective
implementation of the income tax, subsidies, and other forms of
income transfer, is more likely if a reasonable degree of consensus
can be developed. The same issue can also be formulated in terms
of the effect of a particular distributive pattern on socio-political
homogeneity.
Economic interest groups that could become mutually antagonistic may overlap. For example, there could be one conflict of
economic interests between farmers and non-farmers and another
between two linguistic or ethnic groups, yet each of the latter may
include both farmers and non-farmers. In the Taiwan context, in
addition to the usual farmer-non-farmer division, we must also
look into the relative positions of the post-1945 settlers (commonly
described as "mainlanders") and the pre-1945 settlers (commonly
described as "Taiwanese"), who, or whose forebears, came to
Taiwan in earlier times.
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Economic Benefits and Non-economic Values
The preceding remarks have focused attention on the
interrelationships between economic growth and the distribution
of economic benefits_ However, man does not live by bread alone.
A longer life in good health, better education, more congenial
working conditions, stable employment, and, last but not least, a
greater measure of personal freedom are easily among the
desiderata that many would wish to attain. Since economic
development is only one aspect of development, and since with
economic development many other variables will also change, two
questions immediately arise. First, what other variables might
usefully serve as indicators of socio-political-economic development other than the sheer volume of output? 2 Discussion of the
importance of distribution in addition to production can be viewed
as a variant of this question, the scope of which can be expanded
to cover non-economic values. Second, what are the interrelationships among these different variables? In particular, how might
the pattern of distribution of economic benefits affect that of noneconomic values and vice-versa?
Clearly, the development of Taiwan can and should be
analyzed also from this broader perspective. [This is discussed in
a later chapter of the book from which this chapter is excerpted ed.] Nevertheless we might note in this connection that, a priori,
one can envisage the interrelationships between the distributive
patterns of two such variables both as supportive of each other
and as substitutes. Thus, as time passes, a more equitable
distribution of educational opportunities is likely to lead to greater
equality of economic opportunities and, therefore, of income.
Conversely, a more equitable income distribution is likely to lead
to a more equitable distribution of education. 3 In a more static
2. See, for instance, Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics and Economic
Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1967), and D. V. McGranahan, C. Richard-Proust, N. V. Sovani and M.
Subramanian, Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development (New
York: Praeger, 1972). For a discussion on Taiwan in this respect, see Charles H. C.
Kao, "Development Indicators and their Implications for Taiwan's Economic
Development," Industry of Free China, Taipei: Economic Planning Council, Vol.
XXXXI, No. 5 (May 1974).
3. These propositions are predicated on the assumption that the initial level
of educational opportunities is sufficiently high so that their greater availability
would benefit the recipients. Similarly, in the second case, the initial level of
income must be sufficiently high if a more equal distribution is to be beneficial. A
more equal distribution of very little income (or of educational opportunities) would
hardly increase the potential availability of more educational opportunities (or of
income).
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sense, it is quite plausible that at a given time those who are at
the lower end of income distribution could regard greater
educational opportunities, such as special scholarships, as
partially making up the disadvantage they suffer in income
distribution. The initial disadvantage could be viewed as temporary, and more future advantage may be traded for less present
advantage.
Of all the non-economic values to which people aspire,
perhaps the most fundamental is the sharing of political decisionmaking power which can result in a more equitable "allocation" of
all other "values." Consider now the relationship between the
distributive patterns of income - representing all economic
benefits - and of political power- representing all non-economic
values. On the one hand, those who do not enjoy an equal share of
political power may regard a more than equal share of income as
an adequate compensation, at least in the short run, and vice
versa. On the other hand, as equity in the distribution of political
power increases, it is likely to be used to increase equity in income
distribution. 4 By the same token, as income distribution becomes
4.
Increasing
political
equality

1

Increasing
income equality
In the above diagram Point A represents total inequality in both income
distribution and the distribution of political power. Point D, on the other hand,
denotes complete equality in both respects. Point C represents complete political
equality together with complete economic inequality in distribution. At the other
end, Point B represents complete economic equality with complete political
inequality. The proposition advanced in the text is that both B and C are
essentially unstable situations. As political equality increases, for instance,
through the evolution of democratic institutions, it is likely that the more equally
distributed political power will be used to promote economic equality. This
essentially is in accord with the thesis advanced by Simon Kuznets in his 1955
paper on the tendency toward greater income equality during the later stages of
economic development following the establishment of political democracy. See also
Simons Kuznets, "Demographic Components in Size-distribution of Income"
(Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored by the Japan Economic
Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, December 16-20,
Vol. II, July 1975). On the other hand, Point B is also unstable because the
population that shares economic benefit and power equally among its members
will probably be unwilling to support the smaller group holding political power in a

6

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

more equal, barring the existence of a totally authoritarian
government, 5 it will become increasingly improbable for inequity
in the distribution of political power to prevail inasmuch as such
an inequity will become progressively harder and more costly to
support. [These issues are also discussed fully in the next chapter
- ed.]
Finally, the distribution of the benefits of economic development is, of course, only one side of distribution. The obverse is the
distribution of development costs, which one might regard as
negative benefits. Unfortunately, it is not possible to net the
benefits or costs of economic development for individual members
or groups of the society. Rather the two aspects must be
considered separately. Since consideration of the distribution of
the costs of development would require a detailed examination of
the sources of private savings and of the financing of government
capital formation, which would take us far afield, we will confine
our discussion in this paper to an account of income distribution
and how changes in the pattern have come about.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN

Distribution by Income Class - A Preliminary International
Comparison with Developed and Less Developed Countries
According to an IBRD study on income distribution in less
developed countries 6 (LDCs), the typical pattern to be found in an
LDC is as shown in Table 1.
highly concentrated form. Such a situation would seem to require the use of force
by those holding political power in order to maintain their own authority.
Our hypothesis suggests that the two kinds of equality can to some degree be
traded in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction for individual segments
of the population. This is illustrated by the "indifference curves" shown in the
diagram. At the same time, it is also our hypothesis that increase in either income
(or political) equality is likely to facilitate further increases in political (or income)
equality. The movement in the direction from A to D, as denoted by the arrow in
the diagram, tends to become progressively easier, at least for a part of the way.
This part of Kuznets' hypothesis may be true even if his argument that economic
development in its early stages leads to greater inequality may not hold. The point
raised by Oshima in "Income Inequality and Economic Growth, the Postwar
Experience of Asian Countries," in The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XV, No.2
October 1970), is further substantiated in our discussion in the text.
5. One may note in this connection Mao Tse-Tung's concern about the
periodic recurrence of "revisionist tendencies" in mainland China which would
give rise to greater income inequality especially as the lower incomes remain at an
extremely low level absolutely.
6. Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. XVI and 40.
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Table 1. Income Distribution in LDCs
Percent of total Households
Arranged in Descending
Order of Income
Highest 20';7,

Percent of Total Income

sa

2nd 20":,

22
13

:krl 20%
4th 20'!\,

Lowest 20

7
~.

5
Total

100

Sixty-six developed and underdeveloped countries that had
data on income distribution were examined by the author and
classified into three groups: (1) "high inequality" (income share of
the lowest, i.e., poorest, 40% of all households being less than 12%);
(2) "moderate inequality" (income share of the lowest 40%,
between 12 and 17%); (3) "low inequality" 7 (income share of the
lowest 40 1fo, 17% and above). Each of the three groups was further
divided into three subsets according to the level of per capita
income. See Table 2.
Of the 66 countries included in the IBRD study, ten are in
East, Southeast and South Asia.R In terms of GNP per capita,
Japan is the most developed of these ten while Sri Lanka, India,
Pakistan and Burma, all in South Asia, with Burma also
straddling Southeast Asia, are the poorest. The remaining five,
including Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines fall within a relatively narrow range and are all in East or
Southeast Asia. For comparison, the respective income distribution patterns of these Asian countries, as given by Chenery et al.,
can be seen in Table 3.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, especially noteworthy are (1)
the virtually identical pattern of its income distribution with that
of Japan, (2) the close approximation of the Taiwan and Japanese
patterns to that of the United States, and (3) the slightly larger
share of the lowest 40% on the income ladder in the Taiwan and
Japanese distributions as compared with the other Asian
countries of low inequality, or, for that matter, as compared with
the United States.
7. Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the
Problem," Chapter I, in Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8·9.
8. Iran, Iraq and Turkey are regarded as Middle Eastern countries and are,
therefore, not listed here.
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Table 2. Number and Percent Distribution of
Selected Countries in Terms of
Income Distribution
Total

High Inequality

Moderate Inequality

Low Inequality

(1) 26 Countries with per capita GNP up
to US $300 a year
Number 26
Percent 100.0

10
38.4

8
30.8

8
30.8

(2) 21 Countries with per capita GNP of
US $300-750 a year
Number 21
Percent 100.0

10
47.6

6
28.6

5
23.8

(3) 19 Countries with per capita GNP
above US $750
Number 19
Percent 100.0

3
15.8

8
42.1

8
42.1

22
33.3

21
31.8

(4) All 66 Countries
Number 66
Percent 100.0

23
34.8

Source: Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford Univer·
sity Press, 1974), pp. 8·9.

The fact that income distribution has become increasingly
equitable over a lengthy period of rapid growth in GNP per capita
has made the Republic of China on Taiwan one of the few
developing countries whose growth is "distributionally biased" in
favor of persons with low incomes. A comparison with three other
Asian countries can be seen in the estimates of Chenery et al.,
given in Table 4.

The Trend of Increasing Equality in Income
Distribution by Household
The cross-section comparison presented in Table 2 shows the
Taiwan economy as one of low income inequality on the basis of
1964 data. A closer examination can be made by looking at the
same statistics in several benchmark years both before and after
1964. These figures show a progressive decline of inequality
during a 20-year span in terms of several alternative measures
(Table 5).
Several phenomena are most interesting from the point of
view of economic policy, and politically most significant from the

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE ROC
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Patterns of Income Distribution in
Selected Asian Countries
Relative Shares of Income
by Income Class
Year
of
Data

GNP per
Capita
(US$)

Lowest 40% Middle 40% Top20%
of All
of All
of All
Households Households Households

High Inequality
The Philippines
Malaysia

1971
1970

239
330

11.6
11.6

34.6
32.4

53.8
56.0

Moderate Inequality
Burma
India

1958
1964

82
99

16.5
16.0

38.7
32.0

44.8
52.0

Low Inequality
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Thailand
ROK (South Korea)
ROC (Taiwan)
Japan

1969
1964
1970
1970
1964
1963

95
100
180
235
241
950

17.0
17.5
17.0
18.0
20.4
20.7

37.0
37.5
37.5
37.0
39.5
39.3

46.0
45.0
45.5
45.0
40.1
40.0

Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8-9.
According to Chenery et al., "The income shares of each percentile group were
read off a free-hand Lorenz curve fitted to observed points in the cumulative
distribution. The distributions are for pretax income. Per capita GNP figures are
taken from the World Bank data files and refer to GNP at factor cost for the year
indicated in constant 1971 U.S. dollars."
For the benefit of American readers, the corresponding figures for the United
States, also a country of low income inequality, are:
1970

4,850

19.7

41.5

38.8

perspectives both of the Republic of China and of other countries.
One is the combination of a progressive movement toward greater
equality by income class with a sharp increase in GNP and in
average household income over the same period. At constant 1972
prices, per capita GNP in Taiwan rose from NT$10,875 in 1964 to
NT$19,122 in 1972, while average household income rose from
NT$32,452 in 1964 to NT$61,032 in 1972. 9 This means that the
9. At constant 1972 prices the real household income of the lowest decile rose
by 109.2'1[, from NT$9,854 in 1964 to NT$20,618 in 1972. In contrast, the
improvement for the top decile was 52.5'l'n during the same period, from NT$84,454
in 1964 to NT$128,760 in 1972. These data, not including the Taipei municipality

10

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Table 4. Comparative Income Growth Rates
Annual Rates of Income
Growth in Percent by
Class of Income
Recipients

Korea
The Philippines
India
Taiwan

Period

Upper
20%

Middle
40%

1964·70
1961·71
1954-64
1953-61

10.6
4.9
5.1
4.5

7.8
6.4
3.9
9.1

Annual Increase in
Welfare for the
Country as a Whole

Lowest
GNP
Equal Poverty
40%
Weights Weights Weights
9.3
5.0
3.9
12.1

9.3
5.4
4.5
6.8

9.0
5.5
4.1
9.4

9.0
5.4
4.0
10.4

Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., Chapter 2, p. 42.
"Equal Weights" implies a weight of 0.2 for the upper 20% of the income
recipients, and 0.4 and, again, 0.4 for the middle and lowest 40% respectively.
"Poverty Weights" are 0.1 for the highest 20%, 0.3 for the middle 40%, and 0.6 for
the lowest 40%.
Although the "poverty weights" are clearly arbitrary and could just as well be
replaced by other weights, the effect of their use in the case of Taiwan is especially
illuminating.

groups at the lower end of the income ladder enjoyed an
accelerated rate of absolute and relative improvement, which is
what some development economists have advocated as most
desirable. 10 The narrowing of the income gap between the rich and
the poor in the course of economic growth through the faster
improvement of those in lower income intervals is bound to affect
mutual perceptions of one another by people of different incomes,
making the establishment of consensus for major policies easier.
Given the wide distribution of television sets in Taiwan and the
great visual impact of differences in living standards and life
styles due to income differences, this is an important stabilizing
and unifying influence not to be lightly ignored.
A second interesting phenomenon is the continuation of the
trend toward greater equality over the entire 20 year period. The
first decade of economic development was accompanied by a
sharp decrease in income inequality: 18% between 1953 and 1961
for 1972, would yield a ratio between the top and bottom deciles of 6.2. If Taipei is
included, as in Table 2, the ratio becomes 6.8, reflecting the greater concentration
of higher income households in the capital city.
10. See Chenery et al., op. cit.
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Changes in Income Distribution in Taiwan

Distribution in Quintiles

1953

1961

1964

1972

3.0
8.3
9.1
18.2
61.4
28.8
32.6

4.5
9.7
14.0
19.8
52.0
26.4
25.6

7.7
12.6
16.6
22.1
41.0
24.8
16.2

8.6
13.1
17.0
22.2
39.1
24.8
14.3

0.56

0.46

0.33

0.30

Top 10% to bottom 10%
Top 20% to bottom 20%

30.4
20.5

19.3
11.6

8.6
5.3

6.8
4.6

Index of Decile Inequality

0.46

0.37

0.26

0.24

Lowest quintile of all households
Second quintile
Middle quintile
Fourth quintile
Highest quintile
Second highest 15%
Top 5%
Gini Coefficient
Ratio of Income Share

Source: Wan-yong Kuo, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area Changes and Causes" (Paper presented to the Joint JERC-CAME Seminar on
Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and
East Asia, Tokyo, December 16-20, 1974), Table 5. The original 1953 figures are
taken from Kowie Chang, "An Estimate of Taiwan's Personal Income Distribution
in 1953 -Pareto's Formula Discussed and Applied" (in Chinese), Journal of Social
Science, Taipei, Vol. 7 (August 1956): 260. The 1961 estimates are from Kowie
Chang's report on a Pilot Study of Personal Income and Consumption in Taiwan
(mimeographed in English), prepared under the auspices of a National Income
Statistics Working Group of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting &
Statistics (DGBAS), of the Executive Yuan, Table A, p. 23. The 1964 estimates are
those of DGBAS as presented in its report on Survey of Family Income &
Expenditure & Study of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan (in Chinese). The
1972 estimates are also based on DGBAS data, adjusted by Wan-yong Kuo with
income tax receipts data and through the incorporation of data for the Taipei
special municipality which is no longer included in the original provincial figures
following the elevation of its administrative status in 1968. (Provincial Statistics in
1968 still include Taipei.) The 1964 data in this table give us 20.3% for the lowest
40%, 38. 7";, for the middle 40%, and 41% for the top 20%, which are very close to the
estimates for Taiwan in Table 1.

in terms of the Gini income concentration ratio.U This was
followed by a further decrease in terms of the same index of 28.3%
m 1961-64 and of another 9.1% in 1964-72. How did these
11. The Gini index can vary from 0 (total absolute equality) to 1 (total
inequality). The Gini index for family income in the United States was .37
according to the 1960 census and .36 in the 1970 census. That of Japan was .35
(1960). U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 and 1970 Census of Population, Part I, U.S.
Summary, and Annual Report of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey,
Japan, 1963.
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progressive and continued improvements in distribution come
about simultaneously with rapid increases in total output and
several significant shifts of Taiwan's development strategy
during the two decades?

Income Differentials between Farmers and Non-Farmers
and Sectoral Distribution Patterns
If changes in income distribution in Taiwan have resulted in
greater equality in terms of various measures based on income
classes cutting across different economic sectors, what changes in
income differences have occurred both between and in individual
sectors? An answer to this question will go a part of the way in
answering the question raised at the end of the last section. As
mentioned in the Introduction, growing differences in this respect
could also create antagonisms detrimental to economic and
political stability and the national consensus in policy making.
Let us attempt to answer this question with respect to farm
and non-farm families 12 about which considerable statistical
information is available. Using the DGBAS data for 1970-72
adjusted to include the city of Taipei, Kuo Wan-yang shows that
while income equality increased in the entire economy during
1964-72, the degree of equality increased more- that is, the Gini
coefficient decreased more- for non-farm families than for farm
families (Table 6). In 1972, the Gini coefficient showed a greater
degree of equality for the former than for the latter although their
relative standings had been the reverse in 1964. The "cross-over"
occurred between 1970 and 1971. Given these patterns of
distribution within the two sectors, respectively, it is not
surprising that the rapid expansion of the industrial sector in the
late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to greater overall equality
rather than inequality.
Contrary to the preceding favorable distributive effect of rapid
industrial growth, to be explained below, an unfavorable development during 1964-72 was the widening discrepancy between farm
and non-farm incomes although both were rising. Average income
per farm family rose by 53.3% between 1964 and 1972, from
NT$32,013 to NT$49,090, at constant 1972 prices. On the other
hand, average non-farm family income rose by 97%, from
NT$32,740, virtually at par with farm family income, in 1964 to
12. The classification is based on the occupation of the family head. Family
income from all sources is included. Thus, the income of a farm family may include
income from both agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits of all family members.
The same is true of the income of a non-farm family.

13
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Table 6. Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration by Sector
Year

Farm

Non-farm

Both Sectors

1964

0.315

0.336

o.:i28

1968

0.292

0.338

o.aas

1970

0.283

0.285

0.299

1971

0.297

0.292

0.301

1972

0.291

0.288

0.295

Source: Kuo Wan-yong, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area Changes and Causes" (1974). (Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored
by the Japan Economic Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower
Studies, December 16-20, Vol. II, July 1975), Table 7.

NT$64,497 in 1972, 31.5% higher than the corresponding farm
figureP This factor is probably among the most serious potential
threats to income equality if it is allowed to continue unchecked.

Economic Policy and Income Equality
The changes in overall and sectoral income distribution in
Taiwan can be explained in terms of (1) sectoral emphasis and
shifts in development strategy over time, (2) the open economy
and foreign trade orientation of the island, (3) the initial state of
asset distribution and subsequent changes effected by government
intervention, and (4) other governmental measures that have
improved access to education and technology and redirected
investment in favor of certain groups and sectors that might
otherwise have been at a disadvantage in comparison with the
rest of the society.

The 1950s and Early 1960s
Two basic facts should be home in mind. First, since the ratio
of labor to capital in agricultural production, given Taiwan's
small-farm, labor-intensive economy, was a priori greater in
13. Kuo, op. cit., 1974, Table 13. This increasing sectoral discrepancy also
accounted for the fact that the overall Gini index in 1970-72 (Table 4) is higher
than both sectoral coefficients. See Kuo, op. cit., for a technical discussion of what
she calls the "within," "between," and "share" effects.
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agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector during the 1950s, a
larger share of factor income should go to labor in the agricultural
sector than in the non-agricultural sector as production in both
sectors increased. (The reverse may be true in the case of the
labor-land ratio other than urban housing construction.) How the
relative shares of labor to capital (or labor to land) in factor
income might change in the aggregate would depend upon the
relative rates of growth of the two economic sectors during a given
period. Second, as shown in Table 7 the contribution of agriculture
to net domestic product per capita grew at about the same rate
during 1952-60 as did the non-agricultural sector. Thus, if other
things had been equal, the expansion of agricultural and nonagricultural production at a virtually equal pace during 1952-60
should not alter the proportion between factor income earned by
labor and factor income that went to owners of property, i.e., both
land and capital. The benefit of increased production would then
be shared by labor and property owners in the same proportion as
their respective income shares were at the beginning of the period.
Table 7. Contribution of Agriculture to Net
Domestic Product per Capita

Total population (in thousand persons)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture

1952

1960

1972

8,128
4,257
3,871

10,792
5,373
5,419

15,289
5,947
9,342

5,233
9,424

16,528
34,305

38,121
190,217

1,229.3
2,434.5

3,076.1
6,330.5

6,410.1
20,361.5

1.98:1

2.06:1

3.18:1

Net Domestic Product (NT$ million)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture
Per Capita Value-added (NT$)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture
Ratio of Non-agriculture:
Agriculture

Source: Taiwan Data Book (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 1974), pp. 4,
27, 49.

However, other things did not remain equal during this
period. One of the most important economic events in the early
1950s, if not the most important single event, was the implementation of land reform in Taiwan in 1953 (one of the benchmark years
previously selected), preceded during 1949-52 by sale of public land
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and reduction of land rent paid by tenant farmers. The rent
reduction had the effect of reducing the rate of return to property
in the agricultural sector, thereby increasing the relative share of
labor in a period of rising agricultural output and income (Table
8).

Table 8.

Distribution of Agriculture Income
by Factor (in percent)
Land

Capital

Labor

1941

52.20

11.48

36.32

1942

51.99

11.44

36.57

1943

45.65

10.04

44.31

1953

37.39

8.23

54.38

1956

36.28

7.98

55.74

Before Land Reform
(Under Japanese Rule)

Post Land Reform

Source: S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Nung·yeh Fa·chan ti Tsung·ho Lun·shu"
<A Comprehensive Study of Agricultural Development). JCRR Special Report No.
2R, July 1959 reprinted in T. H. Yu, ed., Taiwan Nung·yeh Fa·chan Lun·wen·chi
(Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei: Lien·ching Publications
Co., 1975), p. 37, Table 13.

Under Land Reform, the conversion of many tenants into
owner farmers and wider dispersion of land ownership, with
limitation on the size of individual holdings, had the effect of
further spreading property income among a larger number of farm
families. The net effect of rent reduction and land reform together,
therefore, was to increase sharply the degree of equality in income
distribution in the agricultural sector.
It goes without saying that these beneficial effects of asset
redistribution through land reform could have been at least
partially nullified had agricultural production declined. The
actual increase in production after land reform enabled the
recipients of property income in the agricultural sector also to
enjoy rising income from property ownership. One must therefore
also examine why agricultural output actually increased after
land reform, a point to be discussed elsewhere.
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The overall equalizing effect of greater income equality in the
agricultural sector during 1952-60 was not offset by developments
in the non-agricultural sector where income distribution was more
unequal. Several factors contributed to this outcome. First, the
discrepancy between agricultural and non-agricultural per capita
income which developed later did not widen significantly during
this period. Second, the expansion of production in the nonagricultural sector during this period was probably brought about
by an increase mostly in relatively small businesses, many of
which were established by new immigrant entrepreneurs from the
China mainland. Even in the beginning of the 1970s small firms
employing less than 100 persons each were still responsible for
35% of gross production in manufacturing. 14 Private capital
ownership was not highly concentrated. A number of large
industrial enterprises previously owned by the Japanese had been
taken over by the ROC government and were run as public
enterprises so that income which would have accrued to property
owners of these enterprises went to the Treasury. Third, outside
the economic infrastructure which was expanded by the government and government enterprises, industrial production in
Taiwan during this early phase of the island's postwar economic
development stressed consumer goods production using products
from the agricultural sector as inputs. Thus expansion in the nonagricultural sector had the effect of stimulating production in the
agricultural sector where income distribution was more equal. At
the same time, production in the industrial sector was not capital
intensive; the initial asset distribution did not seem to be highly
14. See Gustav Ranis' essay on Taiwan in Chenery et al., op. cit., 1974.
According to the criteria employed by the ROC government, any firm that is
engaged in manufacturing, processing or handicraft production is officially
designated as a small or medium-sized enterprise (a) if its registered capital and
total assets are below NT$5 million and NT$20 million respectively, or (b) if its
registered capital is below NT$5 million and its employment is below 100-300
persons, the exact cut off being dependent upon the nature of the industry. For
firms engaged in trade, service and transportation the maxima are 50 persons in
employment and NT$5 million in annual sales. Of all these firms, those employing
fewer than one hundred persons are generally regarded as "small businesses."
According to the 1971 Industrial and Commercial Consensus, the small firms
numbered 276,095 or 98.97% of all the reporting firms. Within the manufacturing
sector, they numbered 40,737 or 95.43% of the total. These small manufacturers
were responsible for 35% of gross production, 35.6% of employment, 34% of valueadded, and 45% of export sales, as compared with the entire manufacturing sector.
See C. C. Chao, "Small Business Development" (paper prepared for the US-ROC
Symposium for Small Business Development and Trade Promotion, San Francisco,
March 25-26, 1976).
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concentrated; the small-scale enterprises tended to spread the
benefit of increased production more widely among owners of
industrial property. Also, the most important industrial inputs
used by the agricultural sector at that time, viz., chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, were mostly imported. Their purchase
did not constitute a source of demand for the domestic industrial
sector. Finally, greater industrial employment and the relative
ease of business formation by enterprising persons of low income
were obviously helpful in raising the earnings of the lower-income
groups in the non-agricultural sector.
To sum up, (1) the ROC government's initial emphasis on
agricultural production, (2) asset redistribution through land
reform, (3) the consumer goods and small business emphasis in
the industrial sector, and (4) certain characteristics of asset
distribution of the postwar and post-1949 period were responsible
for the improvement in income distribution in Taiwan during the
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.

From the 1960s to the early 1970s
Although further improvement in income equality slowed
down during the 1960s and early 1970s, a remarkable phenomenon was that the movement toward greater equality continued in
both the farm and non-farm sectors. This occurred in spite of a
widening gap between farm and non-farm family incomes due to
the failure of agricultural production to keep pace with the
accelerated expansion of industrial production. Several factors are
involved in explaining what happened to income distribution in
the second decade.
First, the crux of the development strategy adopted during
this period was the expansion of foreign trade. In the light of the
preceding expansion of the agricultural sector, export expansion
began very naturally with increased export of agricultural and
processed agricultural products. This was helpful in sustaining
agricultural income.
Second, because of the paucity of its natural resources,
Taiwan's foreign trade orientation involved an expansion of both
exports and imports. By eschewing self-sufficiency as an objective, the rapidly expanding exports were based on progressively
increasing imports which included many capital-intensive products. Any attempt to achieve self-sufficiency by stressing import
substitution at this point would doubtless have reduced the rate of
expansion considerably. The export orientation of Taiwan's
economic development not only increased the rate of economic
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growth, but also reduced the rate at which capital's share of factor
income was to increase.
Third, much of the export expansion during this period took
place in the form of labor-intensive products. Imported raw
materials and intermediate goods were processed into finished
goods for export through the concentrated application of labor
which was much cheaper in Taiwan than in the countries where
Taiwan exports were marketed. The several Export Processing
Zones established to attract foreign capital were especially
illustrative of this practice. The effect on income distribution was
twofold. Within the industrial sector, the very rapid expansion of
labor-intensive exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prior to
the 1974 world-wide recession induced by the oil cartel's price hike,
reduced the initial labor surplus and raised wages and employment. The result was to raise the earnings of non-farm families at
the lower income levels. For farm families, participation in the
rapid expansion of the industrial sector took place partly through
access to the new employment opportunities offered. Many women
employees of foreign businesses in the Export Processing Zones
came from farm families. The net effect was to increase the
proportion of non-agricultural income for farm families, especially
those with smaller land holdings. This in turn served to reduce the
income discrepancy between farm and non-farm families, in spite
of the lagging growth of the farm versus the non-farm sector,
while simultaneously increasing income equality in the farm
sector. 15
15. See Chang Han·yu, "Taiwan Nung-chia So-te ti Pien-hua yii Shih-p'ing
Chia-kung chih Fa-chan," (Changes in Taiwan's Agricultural Income and
Development of the Food Processing Industry), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an
(Quarterly Journal of the Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1973). Chang
gives the following data for 1965 and 1971:
Non-agricultural Income as Percent of Agricultural Income
1965

1971

Farm family with cultivated
land under 1/2 ha.

35.3

53.3

Farm family with cultivated
land exceeding 2 ha.

11.8

22.2

Average of all farm families

19.4

28.2

In 1971, for farm families or under .5 hectare, 34.6% of the non-agricultural
income received came from wages, the rest being property income and income from
other occupations, which presumably included both wage and property income. For
families having more than 2 hectares, the proportion of wages in non-agricultural
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In short, a very rapidly expanding industrial sector oriented
to export that was based on processing of imported materials by
highly labor-intensive methods was instrumental in raising
wages, which also benefited farm families. The latter were
progressively becoming less dependent on agriculture as their sole
source of labor income. Under these conditions income equality
was able to improve further, albeit at a slower rate than before.

Distribution of Wealth between Pre- and Post-1945 Settlers
Aside from the distribution of income between farm and nonfarm families, a related distributive factor of major interest is the
relative economic status of the pre-1945 ethnic Chinese settlers of
Taiwan (often loosely referred to as Taiwanese by Westerners)
versus that of the post-1945 settlers (often referred to as
Mainlanders). Since the "Mainlanders" came to Taiwan in 1945 to
take over the Japanese administration, political power was
initially vested entirely in their hands. During the past 30 years,
they have progressively broadened the participation of government so that more and more members of the pre-1945 settler group
are now included in the government hierarchy. This progressively
more equal distribution of political power, more advanced at the
provincial and local government levels than at the central
government level, should be considered in conjunction with the
distribution of economic benefits between the two groups. An
interesting point that concerns us in this paper is whether the
relative economic status of the two groups corresponds to their
relative political positions or whether a different relationship
prevails.
Although income distribution data are not available on the
basis of the dates of immigration of family heads to Taiwan, the
problem can be approached indirectly by examining the distribution of wealth between the two groups. Two major points need to
be borne in mind in this connection. First, the 1953 land reform
which took place not very long after the transfer of the central
government of the Republic of China from the mainland to
Taiwan effectively precluded the existence of absentee landlords.
The earliest group of post-1945 settlers from the mainland
consisted primarily of government officials, members of the armed
forces, officers of public corporations and some businessmen. Few
of them, if any, had either the inclination or time, before the land
reform, to become farm land owners. Thus, land, a form of
income was 1l.l'J'o. The corresponding proportions of wages in non-agricultural
income in 1965 were 26.1% and 15.1 %, respectively.
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physical asset of dominant importance during the early years of
Taiwan's post-World War II economic development, has remained
entirely in the hands of the pre-1945 settlers. Some of the public
land taken over by the ROC government from the Japanese was
also sold to the farmers as a part of the land reform program.
While the government and public corporations, such as Taiwan
Sugar, still own some of the land, there has not been any
redistribution benefiting the post-1945 settlers. Only to the extent
that land has been transferred from crop cultivation to nonagricultural or other agricultural uses could ownership of landed
wealth outside the urban areas become vested in the hands of
post-1945 settlers.
In view of the above, unless the distribution of wealth outside
the agricultural sector were in favor of the post-1945 settlers, the
distribution of wealth as a whole would tend to favor the pre-1945
settlers who are owners of virtually all private farm land. A most
important factor to bear in mind in this connection, therefore, is
the distribution of ownership of large enterprises in the civilian
sector of the economy. In 1975 there were 35 businesses in Taiwan
whose annual sales exceeded NT$1 billion each. In addition,
another 66 firms had annual sales exceeding NT$400 million each
(see Table 9). Altogether 132 firms had annual sales exceeding
NT$200 million each. If these firms are grouped according to
whether the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the President
of the firm 16 are from pre- or post-1945 settler families, 59% of the
aggregate capital of all the firms is accounted for by enterprises
headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 41% by post-1945 settlers.
Furthermore, if a line is drawn at the level of NT$300 million in
capitalization, there are 47 firms above this line. Of these larger
firms, which are further divided into five intervals (see Table 10),
those headed by pre-1945 settlers account for an overwhelmingly
larger proportion of invested capital than the post-1945 settlers in
four groups, the single exception being the group of firms with
capitalization from NT$500 million to NT$1 billion. In contrast,
for firms capitalized below NT$300 million, a larger proportion of
invested capital is accounted for by enterprises with post-1945
settler heads, the only exception being the group of firms with
capitalization of NT$100 to NT$200 million.
Similarly, one can use annual sales as the criterion. On this
basis, of 10 firms each with annual sales in excess of NT$3 billion,
7 are headed by pre-1945 settlers and only 3 by post-1945 settlers.
16. A few firms had non-Chinese Presidents or Board Chairmen.

Table 9. Business Enterprises in Taiwan
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million

z

Aggregate Annual Sales (NT $ million)
Heads
of
l"irms
PrP·194G
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total
Percent

No.
of
Firms
69

Over
6,000
6,147.5
(1)

6:l
l:l2

9,859.5
(1)
16,007.0

fi,OOOto
under
6,000
10,947.3
(2)
(0)
(10)
10,947.3

4,000to
under
5,000

3,000to
under
4,000

9,162.7
(2)
4,080.1
(1)
13,242.8

6,163.0
(2)
3,225.4
(1)

9,3R8.4

2,000to
under
3,000

1,000to
under
2,000

4,559.2
(2)
7,477.7
(3)
12,036.9

12,692.H
(10)
13,970.fi
(10)
26,66:!.:{

Ci

fiOOto
under
1,000

0

Under
500

rs:t!J

Total

22,20:3.7
Ul2)
10,4RO.O
(14)
:l2,6H:l.7

6,162.1
(1H)
11,99fi.H
(:l:l)
18,157.9

7H,O:lH.:l
(69)
61,01-\9.0
(6:{)
I :lH,l27.:l

-----

Pre-194G
Settlers
Post-194fJ
Settlers
Total

t:l
.....

r:n
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52

38

100

69

66

3H

4R

6H

:l4

[i()

48

62

0

31

:l4

62

52

:l2

6(;

14

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

)()()

::e
.....
ttl

c::...,
.....

0

z
z

"":3

:I:
t!J

~

0
0

Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group.
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976.
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Table 10. Business Enterprises in Taiwan
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million
0
0

Total Capitalization (1,000,000 NT $)
Heads
of
Firms
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total
Percent
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total

No.
of
Firms
69
61*
HlO
53

Over
2,000
2,040.0
(1)

(0)
2,040.0
100

1,000to
under
2,000

500to
under
1,000

5,379.3
(4)
2,120.0

5,077.0
(8)
7,430.9

(2)

(11)

7,499.3

12,507.9

72

41

400to
under
500
4,493.7
(10)
810.0
(2)
5,303.7
85

300to
under
400
2,425.3
(7)
680.0
(2)
3,105.3
78

200to
under
300
2,717.0
(12)
3,521.8
(15)
6,238.8
44

lOOto
under
200
2,581.5
(19)
1,907.6
(14)
4,489.1
58

z

...;!

Under
100
429.3
(8)
667.8
(15)
1,097.1
39

trJ

Total

~
'"C

0

25,143.1
(69)
17,138.1
(61)
42,281.2
59

47

0

28

59

15

22

56

42

61

41

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

~
~

><

>

r:n
....
)-

z

r:n
...;!

c:

t:j
....

trJ

r:n

en
trJ
~

t;j

*Two of the firms are without data on capital
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group.
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976.
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In contrast, of 122 firms each with annual sales below NT$3
billion, 62 are headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 60 by post1945 settlers. Furthermore, within each sales interval above the
NT$3 billion mark, firms headed by pre-1945 settlers account for
an overwhelmingly larger proportion of total sales, there being
only a single exception. In all the sales intervals below the NT$3
billion mark the reverse is true, again with the exception of a
single interval.
An earlier survey in 196917 which divided business firms in
Taiwan on the basis of financial groups shows that of 337 firms
which can be clearly identified in terms of ownership by pre- or
post-1945 settlers, 60% were accounted for by the pre-1945 settlers
while the post-1945 settlers controlled 28% (95 firms), with 12% (41
firms) representing combined ownership. Furthermore, the firms
of the pre-1945 group were responsible for 61 o/o of invested capital
on the basis of capitalization and 59% of business revenue in that
year. On the other hand, the firms of the post-1945 group were
responsible for 30% of invested capital and 31 o/o of total business
revenue. The mixed group accounted for 9% of capitalization and
11 o/o of revenue. These earlier statistics point to the larger
ownership of the pre-1945 settlers in business outside the
agricultural sector, but there was no noticeable disparity in size
between the enterprises of the two groups. Hence the growth of the
relative importance of the pre-1945 settlers in the control of the
larger enterprises in the 1975 survey appeared to be a phenomenon of the early 1970s.
Both the 1969 and 1975 statistics lend support to the
conclusion that the larger Taiwan enterprises are headed by pre1945 settlers while the smaller firms have a larger proportion of
post-1945 settler heads. The more recent growth was in favor of
the pre-1945 settlers for the larger enterprises and the post-1945
settlers for the smaller ones. The exceptions to the rule are
relatively few. Although the 1975 data deal with only the larger
firms, while the 1969 data include a wider spectrum of businesses,
comparison of the more recent findings with the 1969 statistics
suggest that there may have been a trend during the first half of
the 1970s for the post-1945 settlers to move up in their relative
economic standing while some members of the pre-1945 settler
group forged even further ahead. In view of the fact that the post1945 settlers were late comers and few of them had settled in
17. See Chang Chiin-Hung, Taiwan She·hui-li ti fen-hsi (An analysis of Social
forces in Taiwan) (Taipei: Huan-Yii Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 32-42.
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Taiwan with vast personal wealth, it is quite understandable that
they have had to compete very hard in the private economic sector
and are not in a dominant position. This can be contrasted with
the more favorable political position the post-1945 settlers enjoyed.
We have already noted the movement toward greater equality in
the distribution of political power in favor of the pre-1945 settlers.
The present statistical analysis indicates that there may have
been a slight and slower shift toward greater equality in the
distribution of industrial and commercial wealth in favor of the
post-1945 settlers. Fortunately for Taiwan, therefore, the redistribution of political power and material wealth can move in
opposite directions, thus serving to compensate each other. A
priori, one is inclined to conclude that this is a situation favoring
greater social stability.

Future Prospects
We have put the preceding discussion on income distribution
in the past tense although many of the conditions of the 1960s and
early 1970s continue to hold today, because several circumstances
now exist that could significantly alter the course of development.
First, Taiwan is trying to shift toward more capital-intensive and
technology-intensive production. It is also trying to supply
domestically more of the manufactured industrial raw materials it
needs. The relative rates of growth of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors will change further and the relative share of
capital as factor income will probably also rise. There is a latent
tendency, therefore, toward less rather than greater equality in
income distribution unless capital ownership can become progressively more equally distributed, and unless other corrective
measures are undertaken. Thus the role of government intervention may have to, and probably will, increase in order to forestall
a reversal of the previous trend toward greater equality in income
distribution. Both existing and new measures, fiscal and otherwise, will have to be expanded, but greater government intervention could stifle productivity and economic growth if adequate
safeguards and judicious restraint are not provided.
Within this context some of the measures adopted in recent
years deserve mention. In the first place, the progressive income
tax, although a part of the ROC's long-standing taxes, has been
implemented much more vigorously in recent years as a result of
technical reforms in data collection and reporting. Income tax
collections increased noticeably between 1966 and 1972, especially
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for the higher income bracketsY· Secondly, among the more recent
measures, reduction of various hidden taxes levied in the form of
rice collection since 1964, and particularly since 1969, has
contributed to greater income equality, especially in reducing the
disparity between farm and non-farm incomes. These two
categories of measures are clearly focused on income transfers.
In the third place, expansion of the stock exchange, which can
be seen in an increase in the number of listed stocks between 1962
and 1973, has been a welcome development in promoting the
dispersion of property ownership. 19 This development could be
extended if institutions can be developed in the near future so that
farm families can progressively participate in industrial expansion by becoming owners of stocks in industrial enterprises just as
they have ah·eady participated by providing labor to the
expanding industrial sector. It may be necessary for the
government to step in by organizing intermediaries in the form of
"mutual funds" which can collect rural savings for investment in
industry, thus altering the distribution of industrial assets which
are growing rapidly.
Another set of government measures has had the effect of
especially accelerating development in the lagging agricultural
sector. Special funds over and above the level of private
investment have been earmarked in recent years for investment in
the accelerated development of agriculture. Central government
funds totalling NT$2.43 billion have been provided for this
purpose in the 1977 fiscal year. As of 1975 year-end, projects
totalling NT$2.58 billion (including central government and other
funds) in expenditure had been approved out of the 1976 fiscal
year program. 20 A portion of the expenditures is channeled
through programs for irrigation, flood control, etc. under the
jurisdiction of the provincial authorities. The bulk of these
expenditures is aimed at expanding the infrastructure of the
agricultural sector. Efforts such as this are aimed at modifying
sectoral balance and income disparity between sectors. There may
be some question about the rate of return obtained from such
special efforts. The issue clearly is one of balancing growth
against distribution and touches upon the central question that
18. See Kuo, up. cit., 1974. The income tax, however, does not seem to have
significantly altered the differential between farm and non-farm incomes.
19. The number of listed stocks increased over 14 times between 1962 and
1973. The increase in their market value was over 43 times. See Kuo, op. cit.
20. See ;eports in the Central Daily News (Taipei), January 4 and 7, 1976.
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economic development, not to mention the overall development of
a society, may have multiple goals.
Finally, there are two important sets of measures that have
begun to be implemented in 1976. One is the ruling that the heads
of government-related banking institutions must henceforth be
rotated so as to avoid the emergence of financial fiefs. The second
development is the progressive implementation of the law limiting
urban land ownership and taxation of large capital gains derived
from such ownership. This is both to avoid overconcentration of
ownership of urban property and to discourage land speculation
and wealth accumulation based on large "unearned" increments.
Thus the authorities are evidently coming to grips with emergent
issues affecting distribution.

The Anti-Poverty Program (Hsiao-k'ang Chi-hua)
In considering income distribution we must obviously examine not only the relative shares of successive segments of the
population on the income ladder, but also especially the absolute
income levels of the lowest income groups. Another effort aimed at
a particular segment of the population is Taiwan's anti-poverty
program. This effort to reduce the number of persons in absolute
poverty and to elevate the income level of persons at the bottom of
the income ladder deserves closer attention. The issue was
officially recognized by the provincial government of Taiwan in
October 1972 as a major plank in its program. 21 Already in 1967 a
set of unified standards was adopted by the Taiwan provincial
government in defining and registering "poverty households."
According to these standards the poorest or "Step 1 poverty
households" consist of those households whose members are
"unable to work" and are devoid of all assets or income. 22 They
are therefore completely dependent upon relief and government
21. For reference see Tai·wan·sheng T'ui-hsing Hsiao k'ang·chi-hua Kung-tso·
shou·ts'e [Anti-poverty Program Manual, edited and published by the Taiwan
Provincial Government, May 1973] and Tai-wan-sheng Cheng-fu She-hui-ch'u
King-tso-pao-kao [Work Report of the Office of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial
Government before the Seventh Session of the Fifth Taiwan Provincial Assembly,
March 31, 1976].
22. The following twelve categories of persons are defined as "without ability
to work":
1. Persons under 16 years of age.
2. Persons in school under 18.
3. Persons under 18 who have no earnings from work and who have
only widowed mothers or grandparents.
4. Parents in active military service.
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aid. The medium or "Step 2 poverty households" are those whose
total income is not more than one-half of the stipulated
expenditure at "subsistence level" and not more than one-quarter
of whose members can work. The minimum or "Step 3 poverty
households" are those whose total income is not more than twothirds of the subsistence level and not more than one-third of
whose members can work. "Subsistence level" is defined as
NT$200 per capita per month or NT$2,400 a year. The "poverty
line," at two-thirds of NT$2,400, is therefore set at NT$1,600 per
person per year. For a family of five persons a total annual
income of NT$8,000 (approximately US$200) would put it on the
poverty line. 2 a
As of 1967 there were 110,036 poverty households in Taiwan,
outside Taipei. In addition, there were 8,929 poverty households in
the municipality of Taipei. In combination there were 118,965
poverty households in all Taiwan. This total amounted to 5.11% of
total households in Taiwan in that year, 5.28% for Taiwan
province and 3.31% for Taipei. Between 1967 and 1971, as a result
of growing economic prosperity, the number of poverty households
declined steadily, averaging 8.9% a year for all Taiwan. A sharp
decrease was further registered immediately after the inauguration of the anti-poverty program in 1972, and the decline of
poverty households has continued since.
5. Persons serving prison or probationary sentence whose unexpired
term exceeds six months in duration.
6. Persons who are disabled or mentally ill and who have no
earnings from work.
7. Men over 60 and women over 55 without earnings from work.
8. Persons registered as missing for more than six months.
9. Persons who have been seriously ill for more than three months
and cannot work and are without regular income.
10. Widowed single parents who have to care for one or more children
under 6 years of age and are without regular earnings.
11. Orphaned children under 12 years of age who are cared for by
grandparents and are without regular income.
12. Women without regular earnings who are six months pregnant
and have to support their own children under three years of age.
The above stipulations are those of the Taiwan Provincial Government.
Similar regulations with minor variations exist in the Taipei Municipality.
2:3. The Taipei Municipality poverty standard, as revised in November 1973,
divides poverty households into two categories only. Step 1 poverty households are
defined identically as the first step poverty households under the Provincial
Government regulations. The Step 2 poverty households are defined in the same
way as the minimum poverty households under the Provincial Government
regulations. However, the minimum subsistence level is fixed at NT$300 a month
instead of NT$200.
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Statistical data on the anti-poverty program are more readily
available for "Taiwan province" outside the Taipei municipality.
As can be seen from Table 11, the number of poverty households
fell from 74.2 thousand in 1971 to 25.7 thousand in 1975. The total
number of persons in such households declined from 391 thousand
to 104 thousand during the same period. While statistics
concerning Taipei are less current, there was also a decline from
8.4 thousand poverty households in 1971 to 7.0 thousand in 1973.
As of 1973, only 1.59% of all households in Taiwan outside Taipei
and 1.64% in Taipei were still classified as poverty households.
Table 11. Number of "Poverty Households" and Persons
Poorest

Medium Poverty Minimum Poverty

Total

HouseHouseHouseHouseholds Persons holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons
1971

16,992

27,196

18,887

110,822

38,368

253,445

74,247

391,463

1972

17,536

28,634

17,182

100,274

33,250

218,001

67,968

346,909

1973

14,461

23,744

11,006

58,062

17,675

114,556

43,142

196,362

1974

11,587

18,882

9,065

48,191

11,254

70,907

31,906

137,980

25,726

103.952

1975

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

It should be borne in mind that poverty households are
defined on the basis of per capita income. A poverty household of
many persons can therefore have a larger family income than a
non-poverty household smaller in size. Therefore, one cannot
assume that households below a certain income level in statistics
of income distribution by household would automatically consist
of poverty households. However, most of such households are
probably below the poverty line. Thus the decline in poverty
households and the reduction of the number of households in
lower income levels on the income distribution ladder discussed
earlier go hand in hand.
With the rise of retail prices, the required expenditures at the
stipulated subsistence level have also increased. However, a study
conducted in 1971 showed that even if the subsistence level
expenditure had been fixed at 50% higher, or NT$300 per person
per month outside the Taipei municipality, the number of poverty
households under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan provincial
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authorities would only be raised by 7.8%. This is considerably
below the 36BJ\J decrease in poverty households registered in 1973
as compared with 1972 when the anti-poverty program was
officially inaugurated. Thus the decline in poverty households
r.luring the first half of the 1970s is quite real and should be
attributed largely to both economic expansion and efforts under
the anti-poverty program.~ 4 In the post-1973 oil crisis period, price
inflation has further increased expenditures at subsistence level.
However, by defining household income, which is compared with
the fixed subsistence level expenditure in determining the poverty
line, at "standard" wage levels by occupation substantially below
the actual wages received, some, if not all, of the effect of inflation
has been offset.
The anti-poverty program includes nine major activities: (1)
expansion of relief and institution care, (2) aid to production
through small business loans and construction of marketing
facilities, (3) active job placement, (4) expansion of occupational
training in cooperation with factories and vocational schools, (5)
construction of low-cost housing in order to improve environmental hygiene, (6) promotion of family planning including free
family visits and advice, (7) promotion of school attendance by
school age children, as well as vocational and adult education,
from poverty households through such measures as tuition loans,
(8) promotion of community production and welfare activities in
order to expand the base of the anti-poverty program beyond the
level of government effort alone, and (9) integration of the
program as a social movement with education, mass communication, and the establishment and expansion of special relief funds.
The basic approach of the program is threefold: (1) increasing
employment and employability, (2) broadening the movement by
enlisting the resources of the society as a whole, which helps
reduce the fiscal and manpower burden on the government, and
(:3) increasing both emergency aid, which helps minimize the
emergence of new poverty households, and long-term aid to those
who really cannot help themselves.
Table 12 shows that the size of the poverty households varies
considerably with the degree of poverty. The poorest, or Step 1
poverty household, averages only 1.6 persons per household while
the average number in the medium poverty household varies from
5.9 persons in 1971 to 5.3 persons in 1974, showing a steady
decline during the period. For the minimum poverty household,
24. Lu Kuang. Tai-wan Ti·ch'u To-P'ing-chung Wen-ti (The Poverty Problem
in Taiwan), She-hui Chien-she Social Reconstruction (Taipei, 1975) pp. 1-24.
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the average number of persons per household varied from 6.6 in
1971 to 6.3 in 1974. These figures suggest that the medium and
minimum poverty households are poor partly because of the large
size of the family. However, since the large family probably
contains persons who could become employed, it may also stand a
better chance of escaping poverty if employment can be found. On
the other hand, the small size of the very poor families indicates
that for them poverty is probably a chronic condition due to old
age, physical disability or, at the other end of the income ladder,
lack of adult care. (See the discussion on single person households
at the end of this chapter.)
Table 12. Number of Persons per "Poverty Household"

Poorest

Medium
Poverty

Minimum
Poverty

All
Poverty
Households

1971

1.6

5.9

6.6

5.3

1972

1.6

5.8

6.6

5.1

1973

1.6

5.2

6.5

4.6

1974

1.6

5.3

6.3

4.3

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

Table 13. Percent Distribution of Poverty Households
by Degree of Poverty

Poorest

Medium
Poverty

Minimum
Poverty

Total

22.9

25.4

51.7

100.0

1972

25.8

25.3

48.9

100.0

1973

33.5

25.5

41.0

100.0

1974

36.3

28.4

35.3

100.0

1971

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

An examination of the distribution of poverty households by
degree of poverty as shown in Table 13 indicates that the above
interpretation is essentially correct. In 1971, nearly 52% of the
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poverty households were in the minimum poverty category while
the medium poverty and poorest households accounted for 25%
and 23'7.J, respectively. By 1974 the poorest households were
responsible for 36% of a much smaller total of poverty households
while the medium poverty group accounted for 28% and the
minimum poverty group 35% of the total, respectively. The larger
relative share of the poorest group indicates the existence of a
hard-core poverty category requiring long-term aid. The largest
reduction of the relative share of the minimum poverty group is,
on the other hand, indicative of the increased employment of its
members to which the anti-poverty program has contributed.
One major thrust of the anti-poverty program is to encourage
poverty households to declare themselves as "self-reliant households." Such a declaration entails a pledge to accept vocational
education, employment guidance, etc. that would help uplift the
household above its poverty status. Annual surveys are conducted
to follow up on the current status of the poverty households,
including the self-reliant households. The survey also includes
households that have risen above the poverty line. The 1974
survey showed that 7% of the members of the poverty households
were chronically ill and 6% were physically handicapped. In
contrast, the same two categories accounted for 4.1 o/o and 3.3%
respectively of the self-reliant households, and the ratios were
even lower - 2.8% and 2.6% respectively - for households that
had risen above the poverty status. Furthermore, the proportion of
persons "able to work" increased from 24% of the members of the
poverty households to 32% in the self-reliant households and 35.5%
in households that had risen above the poverty line. Sixty-six
percent of those who were able to work in the poverty households
were burdened by family misfortunes while about 14% were ill or
disabled. The incidence of these two major reasons for poverty
conditions declined to 60% and 8.7% respectively for the selfreliant households and 51% and 7% respectively for households
that had risen above the poverty line. Furthermore, among the
members of these households that successfully escaped the
poverty line, according to the same survey, 15.7% had complained
about loss of employment or lack of employment opportunities
and 131!;;J of lack of training or work experience. These statistics
again indicate that the most effective means to eliminate poverty
in Taiwan have been increases in employment and employability.
Table 14 shows the percent distribution by type of aid under the
anti-poverty program that has contributed to removing households from the poverty status. Family planning was credited with

32

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

26% of the program's success, followed by vocational training and
employment aid, 24%; medical, surgical and emergency aid, 15%.
Other single categories that have proved significant are family
subsidy, 9%; housing improvement, 7%; and production and
marketing aid, 4%.
Once poverty households have found employment for their
members, their income naturally increases. The 1974 survey
indicates that the median annual income of such households that
had risen above the poverty line was NT$25,763 (US $678). At the
same time, the median annual income of the self-reliant households whose members had found employment was NT$19,534 (US
$514).
Table 14. Types of Aid Contributing to Removal of Poverty
Status under the Anti-Poverty Program
Percent
1.

Family planning

26.3

2. Vocational training and employment aid

24.3

3. Medical, surgical and emergency aid

15.2

4.

Family subsidy

9.0

5. House improvement

6.7

6.
7.

Production and marketing aid
Other

4.3
14.2

--

Total

100.0

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

More recently, Taiwan's anti-poverty effort has begun to focus
its attention on households in certain specific occupations,
notably the salt producers and segments of fishermen families.
The anti-poverty program has also consistently included the
aborigine households living in central Taiwan. The entire antipoverty program is a facet of income distribution that deserves far
more attention and study.

Comparisons with Other Countries
Eastern Europe and Mainland China
The experience of Taiwan in income distribution in relation to
its economic policy and socio-political environment can be
compared with that of mainland China and other communist
countries, as well as with that of other non-communist Asian
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countries, both developing and developed. In making the first set
of comparisons, one's interest turns very naturally toward the
PRC as "the other China," although brief reference might be
made to some European communist countries as well. See Table
15.
Table 15. Income Share of All Households
Year
Yugoslavia
Taiwan
Poland
Hungary
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia

1968
1972
1964
1969
1962
1964

Per Capita
Lowest
40')1,
GNP !U.S.$)
529
503
850
1140
530
1150

18.5
21.7
23.4
24.0
26.8
27.6

Middle
40'!i,

Top
20%

40.0
39.2
40.6
42.5
40.0
41.4

41.5
:39.1
36.0
33.5
33.2

:n.o

Source: For Taiwan, see page 13 of text. For the East European countries, see
Chenery et a!., Redistribution with Growth, pp. 8-9

According to available estimates (mostly from U.N. sources)
cited above, if comparison is made with several East European
communist countries in the mid to late 1960s, Taiwan in 1972
would find itself situated between Yugoslavia and Poland in terms
of the income shares of the lowest 40% and the highest 20% of
income recipients respectively. The same would be true for Taiwan
in 1964. In a very general way one can speak of income
distribution in Taiwan in 1972 as being slightly more "equal"
than it was in Yugoslavia in 1968 and slightly less "equal" than
in Poland in 1964. Yet, in contrast to both Poland and Yugoslavia,
Taiwan is a market economy with ownership of private property.
Because of inadequate official data from Peking, no such
overall comparison of income distribution can be made directly
between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. However, several
indicators can he used to make partial comparisons so that a
plausible overall impression can nevertheless be inferred.
First, regarding the income differential between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, we have already noted above the
declining ratio between farm and non-farm family incomes in
Taiwan in 1964-72. The ratio worsened in 1973, a year of
unprecedented industrial boom before the oil crisis. See Table 16.
However, if the municipality of Taipei is excluded, the
corresponding differentials would be significantly lower: 1.23 in
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Table 16. Change in Ratios of Farm and Non-Farm Family
Incomes
1964
1972
1973
(NT$ per annum, constant
1972 prices)
I. Average farm family income
II. Average non-farm family income
Ratio of 11:1

32,013
32,740
1.02

49,090
64,497
1.31

54,544
81,373
1.49

As shown in Table 17, these income differentials are not
significantly affected by comparing the average disposable
incomes after tax.a
Table 17. Average Disposable Incomes After Tax

A. Average disposable income per
farm household"
B. Average disposable income per
nonfarm household•
Ratio of B:A

1966

1972

1973

30,423

46,481h

52,123"

32,718
1.08

61,293h
1.32b

77,394•
1.48"

Sources: (a) These disposable income estimates are calculated by Han-yii
Chang, "Taiwan Ching-chi fan-chan kuo-ch'eng-chung so-te fen-p'ei chih fen-hsi"
(An Analysis of Income Distribution in the Process of Taiwan's Economic
Development), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi·k'an (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly), Volume
26, No. 4, Taipei, December 1975, Tables 2-1 and 2-2, pp. 12-13.
(b) Kuo, op. cit., July 1975, Table 13.

1972 and 1.35 in 1973. This can be seen from the data for Taiwan
Province (i.e., Taiwan excluding Taipei) in Table 18.
When the average disposable income is calculated on a per
capita rather than per household basis, the excess of non-farm
household income would rise to 50% in 1972 and 65% in 1973.
Apparently the larger size of the farm household made the farm
sector even worse off on a per person basis.
If comparison is made between the data for Taiwan including
Taipei and those excluding Taipei, it is quite clear that the higher
income households in the capital city make the income differential
between the farm and non-farm sectors much higher than it would
otherwise be. Furthermore, inclusion .of Taipei makes the
worsening of the differential between 1972 and 1973 proportionately somewhat greater (from 1.31 to 1.49) than it would otherwise
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be (from 1.22 to 1.36). This phenomenon points to the greater
concentration of higher income families in the capital.
Table 18. Income Differentials for Taiwan Province
1972

1973

49,033
60,010
1.22

54,352

46,429

51,934

57,022
1.23

70,318
1.35

1966

1972

1973

4,244
5,628

7,140
9,348

8,153
12,047

Average income per farm family
Average income per non·farm family
Ratio of H:A
A. Average disposable income per farm
household"
B. Average disposable income per non·farm
how;ehold"
Ratio of B:A

A.
H.

Source: (a)

7:~.957

1.36

Chang, op. cit.

c. Average disposable income per
person in farm households
(1)
Estimate
(2)
Estimate
D. Average disposable income per
person in non·farm households
Estimate
Estimate

(1)
(2)

6,206
8,620

10,776
16,174

13,472
20,920

Ratio of D:C
Estimate
Estimate

(1)

1.46
1.53

1.50
1.73

1.65
1.73

(2)

Source: Chang, op. cit. Estimate (1) is based on Survey reports on family
income and expenditures. Change also presents an alternative estimate (2) based
on farm household accounts.

While sectoral income disparity between agriculture and nonagriculture, together with the greater disparity attributable to
Taipei within the non-agricultural sector, plagues Taiwan as a
distributional problem, as it does other developing countries, the
disparity is by all counts even greater on the Chinese mainland.
According to one American estimate, 25 the money income of the
2ii Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's
Repulic of China, 195.1·65 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1967), p.
13.
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average mainland Chinese non-agricultural worker was around
¥560 a year in 1960 or about four times that of the average
peasant, thus inferentially making the latter's income about ¥140
a year. While the -¥560 figure refers to the worker, the average
annual income of the entire worker-employee (chih-kung, or
worker and staff) group was ¥656 in 195826 and remained at the
roughly constant level of ¥650 in 1971.27 (The official press
compared this 1971 figure with that of 1952, noting that it was a
50% increase, but omitted to compare it with the 1957 or 1958
benchmark level.) It is not clear whether the average worker's
income also remained stationary in 1958-71, although any
increase that may have occurred could not be significant since the
average of the numerically larger worker-employee group, which
includes the numerically larger sub-group of workers, became even
slightly lower, ¥650 instead of ¥656. 28 Peking's policy to keep the
worker's income low is essentially intended both as a means of
maintaining a high rate of capital investment and of keeping the
income disparity between farmers and non-farmers within
bounds.
According to a British author, a survey of rural-urban income
differentials in Kiangsu suggested that on the average the urban
worker's income in 1957 was probably twice that of the peasant
working on a cooperative farm. 29 Allowing for changes in the
pricing of goods both bought and sold by the urban and rural
workers, some narrowing of this differential may have occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s.
In two production teams whose accounts are used as
illustrations in texts for training financial and accounting
workers, the average per capita annual incomes of peasant
households in 1971 were ¥-108 and ¥-139 respectively (Table 19).
Other per capita figures given for both production brigades and
26. The Ta Kung Pao (Peking), May 24, 1958.
27. NCNA International (Peking), September 18, 1971.
28. In his testimony on the allocation of resources in mainland China,
Michael Field stated that
The average wage of a worker in China now [1975] is about the same as it was
in 1957, . . . . In real terms ... , so there has been no appreciable increase in
the standard of living.
In various times, e.g., 1967, 1968 and 1974, "There were demands for increased
wages and for better times." See "People's Republic of China: An Economic
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second
session, May 18, 1972), p. 72.
29. See Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China,
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 50-51.
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communes in six geographically widespread areas, possibly for
different years, vary from ¥94 to as high as ¥176 and are
generally in the same order of magnitude as the two textbook
examples cited before. Still other average annual farm household
incomes in 1957 vary from ¥171 for Kansu province to ¥306 for
Szechwan, ¥399 for Hopei, and ¥454 for Kiangsu. 30 Depending
upon the number of full-time workers and the size of farm and
non-farm households, alternative ratios of non-farm to farm
household incomes can be obtained as shown in Table 20.
Table 19. Annual Income in 1971
A Production
Team in
Liaoning"

A Production
Team in
Hunanb
(in current yuan)

Per farm household
Per farm worker
equivalent
Per capita

475.4

432.0*

369.7 (1.3 persons/house·
hold)
138.6 (3.4 persons/household)

108.0

Sources: a. Department of Agricultural Economics, Liaoning Academy of
Finance and Economics, ed., Cheng-yang Tso-hao Shen-ch'an-tui Ts'ai-k' uai
Kung-tso, (How to Do Financial and Accounting Work in the Production Team
Properly) (Shenyang: Liaoning Jen-min Publishers, 1973), p. 105.
b. Hunan Revolutionary Committee, Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and
the Hunan Financial and Accounting Training Program, ed., Nung-ts'un Jen-minkung-she Sheng-ch'an tui K'uai-chi, (Accounting in the Production Team of an
Agricultural Commune) (Hunan: Jen-min Publishers), p. 84
*estimated.

In spite of the inadequacy of data, one can probably conclude
that the average income of non-agricultural households in
mainland China in the early 1970s was about twice that of
agricultural households and that it might be three to four times as
large, if not more.:n The differential was in any case significantly
larger than the current ratio in the Republic of China.
30. See People's Daily (Peking), May 5, 1957.
31. According to a U.S. Government analyst, "In 1970-71, industry-related
production had caught up with agriculture-related production, and the 15 percent
of the people in the urban areas were producing six times as much per capita as
their country brethren." Although the differential between urban and rural
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Table 20.
(1)
Non-agricultural Household
Income

Alternative Income Ratios

Kansu
Szechwan
Hopei
Kiangsu

1.5

(a) ¥- 975

Liaoning
Hunan

(b)

(b) ¥-1300

Annual
income per
full-time
workers
(a)

-¥650

X

(II)
Average Agricultural
Household Income
1957

Household
Income
Assumed
number
of full-time
equivalent
workers per
household

(II)

¥171
306
399
454
1971
475
432

Ratio of
(I) to (II)

(a)
5.70
3.19
2.44
2.15
(a)
2.05
2.26

(b)

7.60
4.25
3.26
2.86
(b)
2.74
3.01

2

Within the agricultural sector, the pattern of income distribution among farm households was sharply altered in mainland
China through the initial redistribution of land from former
"landlords" and "rich peasants" to "poor peasants," accompanied
by the reduction of farm laborers. 32 However, inequality has
increased subsequently for several reasons. First, whenever
distribution according to labor is the dominant form of distribution in the PRC rather than distribution according to need, 33
inequality among households can come about as a result of
unequal distribution of labor and skills among them. The relative
emphases of the two forms of distribution have continued to be a
incomes per capita is not the same as average non-agricultural and agricultural
family incomes, this differential is in the same area of magnitude as estimates in
the text suggest. Furthermore, it is also about double the ratio of the nonagricultural sector and the agricultural sector in Taiwan in terms of per capita
value-added in 1972 (3.18:1). See page 18 of text.
The quotation is taken from Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy
and Economic Results, 1949-71," in "People's Republic of China: An Economic
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second
Session, May 18, 1972), p. 41.
Ashbrook also thought that the bulk of the new agricultural inputs had gone to
the favored communes and brigades so that an important ideological controversy
dealt with the contrast between "rich brigades" and "poor brigades."
32. See Peter Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), for extensive calculations on changes
in class and income distribution.
33. "Need" is presumably defined by the party cadres rather than the income
recipients.
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matter of controversy for nearly two decades. Secondly, under the
system of distribution practiced in 1971, each member of the
production team is rewarded principally according to the number
of work points he earns through labor. However, the value of a
work point depends upon the total number of work points
accumulated by all the team members and the net income
available for distribution among them. The net income is, in turn,
the difference between gross income and the aggregate amount of
taxes, compulsory purchase by the state, production cost,
collective consumption, collective investment, payment to the
higher level production brigade, and addition to the team's
inventory. Since these deductions are of fairly stable proportions,
disparity in the gross income of different production teams is a
source of disparity in income distribution. Differences in gross
income occur regionally due to differences in soil, climate, and the
nature of crops (e.g., industrial crops versus cereals). In 1957,
among the four provinces of Kansu, Szechwan, Hopei and
Kiangsu, the difference varied from 1 to 2.65. In the same year, in
Shensi province, the range of variation among different agricultural regions was from 1 to 6.4. Similarly, the composition of
agricultural production in terms of livestock, fruits, fishery
products, and crops also varies among provinces, and changes in
their respective procurement or market prices would affect relative
income regionally. A final source of income disparity consists of
differences in income derived from private plot and free market
sales.
Within the industrial sector, a rough comparison can be made
between Taiwan and Mainland China in terms of income
distribution in several ways. In the first place, the wage rate
differential between the lowest and highest rates on an 8-grade
scale employed in the PRC appears to be noticeably wider than
the corresponding differential between unskilled and skilled labor
in Taiwan's industrial sector. According to Peking's wage scale of
1955, the highest wage rate (grade 8) was generally a little over
three times that of the lowest. The corresponding ratio of the wage
rate at grade 6 to that of grade 1 was generally around 2.2 to 2.4. 34
Some adjustments in wage rates have taken place since 1955,
especially in the 1963 wage reform, but the differential may not

34. See Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the
People's Republic of China, 1953-1965 (Albany, New York: State University of New
York Press, 1968), Table 2, p. 21.
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have varied greatly. 35 In contrast, the wage differential between
unskilled and skilled labor in manufacturing in Taiwan during
1970 varied from a low of 1 to 1.43 in the cement industry to a
high of 1 to 2.19 in the ebctronics industry. 36 The Taiwan wage
differential in 12 different manufacturing industries in July 1970
can be seen from Table 21.
Table 21. Average Monthly Wage in Taiwan (NT$)
Industry
Clothing
Synthetic fibers
Motor cycles
Cotton textile
Cement
Food Manufacturing
Plastics
Plywood
Electric Appliances
Pharmaceuticals
Electronics
Wool textiles

I
Skilled
Labor

3,090
2,960
2,930
2,600
2,520
2,510
2,480
2,460
2,340
2,300
2,280
1,950

II
Unskilled Differential
Labor
I!II
1,590
1,760
1,130
1,420
1,910
1,640
1,410
1,470
1,660
1,510
1,070
1,450

1.62
1.56
1.96
1.83
1.43
1.49
1.66
1.67
1.50
1.73
2.19
1.54

Source: Chen Hsi-chao, "Taiwan Ti-ch'ii Ch'an-yeh Yuan-kung Yi-tung Yenchiu" (Turnover of Production Workers in Taiwan), in Li Ch'eng (ed.), Taiwan Jen-li
Ts'u-yilan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Human Resources), (Taipei: Lienching Publications Co_, 1975), p. 484.

What has happened in mainland China is a concentration of
a far larger group of persons in the lower wage grade, and this has
had the effect of yielding a very low income inequality. However,
the average wage rate as well as the total wage bill have been kept
very low through very high profit rates which are, however,
appropriated by the State as a result of nationalization of
35. Cf. Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China,
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 96.
36. In mainland China the comparable ratios in 1955 were 2.19 (grade 6 to
grade 1) and 3.00 (grade 8 to grade 1) in the cement industry and 2.22 (grade 6 to
grade 1) and 3.04 (grade 8 to grade 1) in light industry as derived from Charles
Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's Republic of China,
1953-65 op. cit. There are also substantial regional differentials in industrial
wages. See Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972, op.
cit., p. 52.
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industry. 37 Without attempting to construct income distribution
estimates for all households in mainland China, which cannot be
done for lack of data, especially in more recent years, one can
probably safely assert:
1. that income distribution in the industrial sector, as well as

in the agricultural sector, shows a high degree of equality in the
small geographical and enterprise units, but this is modified by
regional disparity to a degree that we cannot determine;
2. that there is a very wide differential between farm
household and non-farm household incomes, the disparity being a
great deal larger than the corresponding disparity in Taiwan;
3. that the average non-farm worker's income (say at ¥650 a
year, or approximately US$325) at the official exchange rate
would yield more than $650 for a two full-time working member
family, this family income being only 40% of the average nonfarm family income in Taiwan (about NT$64,500 or US$1,612,
also at the official exchange rate). If the average mainland
Chinese farm household has no more than one-half to one-quarter
of the non-farm household's income, while farm family income in
Taiwan is only 30% below that of the non-farm family, the farm
family on the Chinese mainland would probably enjoy an income
varying from 14 to 29% - which one can conservatively place at
30%- of the corresponding farm family in Taiwan. 38
Finally, both Taiwan and mainland China grant subsidies to
individuals and groups, thus altering the distribution of real
income. In the case of Taiwan, the nine-year free schooling
introduced in 1969 has probably benefited the low-income groups
more than those of higher income. It has therefore contributed to a
reduction of real income inequality in Taiwan, both in the short
run and in the long run. While such subsidies also exist in
37. Recent studies of Jung-chao Liu, State University of New York at
Binghamton, have dealt with the comparison of wages and profits between China
and India.
38. If the non-farm family income in Taiwan is denoted by 100, the
corresponding figure for mainland China, as discussed in the text, would be 40.
One-quarter to one-half of the 40 would yield a figure of 10-20 as the corresponding
value of the mainland Chinese farm family's income. If the Taiwan farm family
has an income 30'!'o below that of the non-farm family, its income level can be
denoted by 70. Comparing 10 or 20 with 70 we obtain percentages equal to 14.3 and
28.6, respectively. Granted that such comparisons based on official exchange rates
raise methodological issues, they are nevertheless illuminating as rough indications of orders of magnitude.
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Communist China, the effect need not be the same and may even
be in the opposite direction, either because the subsidies to
different groups are not of the same quality -barefoot doctors do
not provide the same medical service as the modem medical
facilities in the cities - or because the subsidy is only granted to a
certain group which may happen to be the higher income group,
thus increasing rather than diminishing the income gap. An
example of the latter genre is the low residential rent in cities,
which benefits only the urban dwellers. Distributive justice in
mainland China is often based on class origin in the precommunist period, thus departing from the criterion of current
economic status. In Taiwan measures to modify income distribution do not contain an element of retribution.

Non-communist Asian Countries
An interesting comparison can be made between Taiwan and
South Korea among the non-communist Asian developing countries.
Both countries underwent asset redistribution in the agricultural sector through land reform. Both did not suffer from initially
large inequalities in the distribution of assets in the nonagricultural sectors inasmuch as Japanese-owned assets were
taken over by the respective governments after World War II. On
the other hand, the destructive Korean war had a further levelling
effect in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors
from which Taiwan fortunately escaped. Like Taiwan, Korea also
went through an initial phase of import substitution before it
turned toward export promotion, and it was after 1964, especially
in the 1970s, when the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports
began that, again like Taiwan, Korea entered a stage of very rapid
economic growth. Largely because of the war, however, Korean
agriculture did not enjoy the kind of rapid growth simultaneously
with asset redistribution through land reform. Hence the initially
equalizing effect of land redistribution was not compounded by
growth. Furthermore, the disparity between farm and non-farm
income in Korea might be widening more than it has done in
Taiwan.
In combination, these factors have given South Korea an
income distribution resembling but somewhat more unequal than
that of Taiwan. On the other hand, while there probably was little
change in the Korean pattern between 1964 and 1970,39 there was
39. See Irma Adelman on "South Korea" in Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (Annex 1974), pp. 280-285.
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continued improvement in the Taiwan pattern as shown in Table
3. It is also possible that the available Korean data have
underestimated the very large incomes. 40 In the absence of post1970 information and Korea's rapid economic and export growth
since 1970, one cannot state unequivocally whether the Korean
and Taiwan patterns of income distribution are now closer or
farther apart than before.
If comparison is made between Taiwan and India, 41 a
significantly greater income inequality seems to prevail in India. 42
This would seem to be attributable, inter alia, to the following
factors: first, India has been unable to implement its policy of
land redistribution which it has consistently advocated as an
integral part of economic planning. The difference between the
Taiwan and Indian experiences in this respect would seem to lie
both in their disparity in size and in the political conditions facing
the two countries. Second, India has not adopted a foreign trade
orientation in its development strategy as has Taiwan. Nor has
India followed an agricultural emphasis in its initial phase of
development. Again, the very much larger size of the Indian
economy and greater resource availability in comparison with
Taiwan have contributed to the two countries' different approaches. Ideological differences between the political leaders of
the two constitute another important factor. Finally, given its
development strategy, it would be all the more important for India
to resort to government measures to modify asset and income
distribution. Yet for the same reasons as those that have stymied
land reform, it seems that India has been unable to take sufficient
and appropriate corrective measures to redistribute income.
Taiwan, on the other hand, presents a contrasting experience.
Because of the many resemblances the economic development
of Taiwan bears to that of Japan, an interesting comparison can
be made with Japan from the point of view of income distribution.
First, according to the Japanese employment status survey, the
Gini index of the agricultural sector increased from 0.3097 in 1962
to 0.3470 in 1971 during a period of very rapid economic growth.
40. See Hakchung Choo, Review of Income Distribution Studies, Data
Auailahility and Associated Problems for Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan,
Korea Development Institute, Monograph 7406 (1974).
41. For a brief discussion on the Indian case, see Chenery et al., Redistribu·
tion with Growth (1974), op. cit.
42. Various estimates of income distribution data in India are given in
Chapter III, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution," Economic Survey of
Asia and the Far East, 1971, United Nations Publication E/CN.ll/1047, pp. 49-64.
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On the other hand, income distribution in the non-agricultural
sector became more equal during the same period, declining from
0.3231 in 1962 to 0.3199 in 1971. These divergent movements had
the net effect of reducing the Gini index of income distribution for
all households from 0.3351 in 1962 to 0.3261 in 1971. 43 The
changes paralleled those of Taiwan after 1968 which we have
previously pointed out.
One of the reasons for the improvement in income distribution
in the non-agricultural sector during this period of rapid growth
was the disappearance of surplus labor, especially unskilled labor.
On the other hand, among the factors working for greater
inequality was an increase in the number of "non-standard"
households, that is, households headed by single persons or
persons either just entering or just retiring from the labor force.
The last factor was partly a result of demographic changes in the
age composition of the Japanese population and partly an
outcome of migration from rural to urban areas, accompanied by
the formation of separate households by young workers who tend
to be poorer. In the agricultural sector, greater use of capital
equipment, especially on the larger farms, had the effect of
increasing the importance of property income. On the whole, an
allegedly narrow distribution of property in Japan may also have
had the effect of creating greater inequality. Lastly, the disparity
in the rate of growth of productivity and earned income in
agriculture verses non-agriculture also had the effect of widening
income disparity between the two sectors.
On the basis of Taiwan's experience as discussed earlier, the
disparity of growth between agriculture and non-agriculture, the
shift of rural workers to industry - although young Chinese
women working in the export processing zones have not really set
up separate households and are still regarded as contributors to
the income of the farm households from which they have come and the gradual disappearance of labor surplus all bear strong
43. These data are quoted in Richard Osamu Wada, Impact of Economic
Growth of the Size Distribution of Income: The Postwar Experience of Japan,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii (May 1975). Wada's study also
presents an analysis of income distribution adjusted for various understatements
of income. According to his data, there continues to be a widening of income
disparity in Japan although the trend had slowed down during the latter phase of
the 1956·71 period. The phenomenon noted above in the case of Japan is also
discussed by Simons Kuznets as common to developed countries where separate
households headed by young people, including many households of single persons
who leave their parental homes early, tend to increase disparity in income
distribution. See Simon Kuznets, op. cit.
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resemblances to the experience of Japan. It remains, however, to
be seen whether the distribution of property income in Taiwan
will in fact become more unequal or whether governmental
measures to modify distribution will succeed in offsetting this
potential development.

